The traditional fear when dealing with contracts is that somewhere in the fine print, there would be terms and conditions that would exclude liability without the knowledge of the party signing it. One can imagine a situation where a contract is breached, the plaintiff sues to enforce the terms, only to be shown a clause deep in the fine print that undoes everything. It is the legal nature of this state of affairs that would be discussed here. These clauses are known as exclusion clauses and limiting terms.
An exclusion clause is a term by which a party to a contract seeks to exclude the liability he would otherwise bear under it. A limiting term, on the other hand, does not remove the liability completely. It caps it, for example at a fixed sum per package. In principle, parties are free to agree such terms. For instance, a seller of goods can exclude the terms the Sale of Goods Act would otherwise imply into the contract. But ultimately, like most other areas of law, the true state of affairs is more nuanced.
These clauses are mostly found in standard form contracts, where the terms are printed in advance and are the same for every customer. Common examples are contracts for electricity supply, laundry and dry-cleaning, hotel accommodation, and carriage by land, sea and air. The consumer cannot negotiate. He either accepts the contract as it is or does without the goods or service. Meaning that, in such transactions, freedom of contract hardly exists.
In Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616, Lord Diplock drew a line between two kinds of standard form contract. The first kind (bills of lading, charterparties, insurance policies) were settled over the years by negotiation between commercial interests of fairly equal strength, so their terms are presumed to be fair. The second kind is more modern. Its terms are dictated by the party with the stronger bargaining power, and the weaker party is told, in effect, “take it or leave it”. No such presumption applies to it.
In England, the court-made rules in this area have been largely overtaken by statute. In Nigeria, there was no such legislation, until the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 2018.
This work would discuss exclusion clauses and limiting terms under the following headings:
- The rules on unsigned documents.
- The rules on signed documents.
- General rules of construction that apply to both.
- The doctrine of fundamental breach.
These would be taken one by one below.
Unsigned Documents
The rules on unsigned documents are far stricter on the party relying on the clause. It is much harder to escape liability through an exclusion clause where the other party did not sign the document containing it. The following are the rules that the courts use to determine the extent of application of exclusion clauses for unsigned documents.
Sufficient Attempt Must be Made to Bring Notice to the Terms
If a document is unsigned, then the courts would take note of the amount of notice that was given to the user and judge whether it was sufficient, especially paying attention to the surrounding circumstances.
The rules were first laid down in Parker v South Eastern Railway Co. (1877) 2 CPD 416. The plaintiff deposited a bag in the cloakroom at the defendant’s railway station, paid 2 pence and received a ticket. The front of the ticket said “see back”, and the back limited the company’s liability to 10 pounds per package. The bag was lost and the plaintiff claimed 24 pounds 10 shillings. The Court of Appeal set out these guidelines:
- If the person receiving the ticket did not see or know there was writing on it, he is not bound by the conditions.
- If he knew there was writing and knew or believed it contained conditions, he is bound.
- If he knew there was writing but did not know it contained conditions, he would still be bound if the party giving the ticket did all that was reasonably sufficient to give him notice of them.
The court additionally stated that what counts as reasonable notice depends on the type of document. A motorist would reasonably assume that a toll-gate receipt is nothing more than evidence of payment. A shipper, on the other hand, is bound by the conditions in a bill of lading whether he reads them or not, because shippers know such documents contain terms and conditions.
The appeal court ultimately returned the case to the trial court for a retrial to determine if sufficient notice of the terms was provided to the plaintiff. Regardless, the guidelines set by the court have been implemented and reinforced by other decisions.
In Odeniyi v Zard & Co. (1972) 2 UILR 34, the plaintiff paid for wire netting and was issued a receipt marked “E. and O.E.” (errors and omissions excepted). The defendants never delivered, and when sued, they argued that the letters entitled them to withhold delivery and renegotiate the price. Johnson J. held that the plaintiff was not bound. A person issued a receipt for payment would not reasonably look for conditions in it. Also, even if he saw the letters, their meaning was peculiarly within the defendants’ knowledge, and the court would not resolve an obscure term in favour of the defaulting party.
In Chapelton v Barry UDC [1940] 1 KB 532, the plaintiff hired two deck-chairs, paid for them and put the tickets in his pocket without reading them. The chair collapsed and he was injured. The back of the ticket excluded liability for injury. The Court of Appeal held that no reasonable person would see the ticket as anything other than a receipt, so the clause did not bind him.
A waybill is similar to a bill of lading, and the Nigerian courts have held that it is a contractual document. In Iwuoha v Nigerian Railway Corporation (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 500) 419, the appellant sent three packages by rail from Aba to Bukuru, near Jos. Two were missing on arrival and he claimed N40,000. The waybill stated that goods were carried subject to the Nigerian Railway Corporation Act 1955 and its Tariff Regulations, which limited liability to N20 per package unless the value was declared in writing. The Supreme Court held that the waybill was a contractual document and the regulations were incorporated into it by reference. He was entitled to only N40.
The Time of the Notice
The time when the notice was brought to the attention of the party is also important. Notice that is given after the conclusion of the contract is not going to be binding.
In Olley v Marlborough Court [1949] 1 KB 532, a couple booked a hotel room at the reception desk. A notice in the bedroom said the hotel would not be liable for articles lost unless handed in for safe-keeping. The wife’s fur coat was stolen from the room. It was held that the contract was concluded at the reception desk before they saw the notice, so the hotel could not rely on it. In the same vein, Lord Denning in Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971] 2 QB 163 held that the conditions on a ticket from an automatic car park machine came too late, since the contract was made after the money went into the machine.
Previous Course of Dealing
A party may be bound by a clause he only saw after the contract was concluded if there has been a previous course of dealing between the parties. It must be shown, though, that he had actual knowledge of the terms, not merely that he knew there were conditions.
In Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 Bradshaw kept his orange juice in Spurling’s warehouse. However, the orange juice got spoilt and he refused to pay, so Spurling sued. Bradshaw contended that Spurling was negligent in the handling the orange juice, causing it to spoil. Spurling contended that there was a clause that exempted them from liability in cases of negligence, although the document with the clause was given to the Bradshaw after he had deposited his goods.
The court also found that this wasn’t the first time both parties had this contractual arrangement. Bradshaw had deposited his products with Spurling multiple times and access to the terms. As a result, the court held that the exemption clause would be binding since there was a previous course of dealing between the parties.
Illiterate Parties
A higher degree of notice is needed to bind an illiterate person. In Otegbeye v Little (1906) 1 NLR 70, the plaintiffs’ kola nuts were lost when the lighter carrying them capsized. The defendants relied on a clause on the receipt they had issued. In holding that the defendants had not done all that was reasonably necessary to bring the clause to the plaintiffs’ notice, the court took into account the fact that the plaintiffs were illiterate.
Signed Documents
The position on signed documents is simple. In the absence of fraud, duress or misrepresentation, a person who signs a document is bound by the exclusion clause in it, whether he read it or not.
The leading case is L’Estrange v Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394. The plaintiff signed an order form for an automatic slot machine. In very small print, the form excluded “any express or implied condition, statement, or warranty”. The machine did not work properly. The plaintiff argued that she knew nothing about the contents of the form and the print was too small to read. The Court of Appeal held that she was bound, and that it was “wholly immaterial” whether she had read the document. This simply means that the signer is bound, not because he has read and understood the document, but because by signing he has signified his assent to it.
A party is equally bound where the document he signs refers to another document containing the clause. In Chagoury v Adebayo (1973) 3 UILR 532, the plaintiff claimed he won 500 pounds on a 1 pound stake with a football pools company. The company relied on its rules, which allowed it to cancel any entry. The plaintiff had signed a document stating “I have read and agree to the Rules and Conditions”, but the rules were in a separate document. Reversing the magistrate (who had applied the sufficient notice rules), the Lagos High Court held that the plaintiff was bound because he signed the main document and certified that he had read the rules.
Note however, that a signer is not bound where the other party misrepresented the effect of the clause. In Curtis v Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co. [1951] 1 KB 805, the plaintiff took a wedding dress for cleaning and was asked to sign a receipt exempting the cleaners from all liability for damage. When she asked why, she was told it only covered the beads and sequins. The dress came back stained. It was held that the cleaners could not rely on the clause. According to Denning L.J., any words or conduct that mislead the other party as to the existence or extent of the exemption would be enough.
General Rules
The following rules apply to both signed and unsigned documents.
The Contra Proferentem Rule
Under the contra proferentem rule, written words are construed against the party relying on them. So, any ambiguity in the meaning or scope of an exclusion clause would be resolved against the party who inserted it.
The courts read such clauses strictly. In Baldry v Marshall [1925] 1 KB 260, a car was sold under a contract excluding “any other guarantee or warranty, express or otherwise”. The car turned out unsuitable for the buyer’s purpose, a breach of the implied condition in S.14(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893. It was held that the clause covered only guarantees and warranties, as it stated nothing about conditions. The sellers were therefore liable for breach.
The contra proferentem rule also applies to ambiguity regarding negligence. Where a party could be liable both in negligence and on some other ground, an exclusion clause would not be read as covering negligence unless it refers to it specifically. The courts regard it as inherently improbable that one party would intend to free the other from the consequences of his own negligence.
For example, in White v Warwick [1953] 2 All ER 1021, the plaintiff hired a bicycle under an agreement that nothing in it would make the owners liable for personal injuries to the rider. The saddle tipped forward and he was thrown off. It was held that the clause covered only liability in contract, it didn’t cover negligence. As a result, the defendant was held liable under negligence.
In Hollier v Rambler Motors (AMC) Ltd [1972] 2 QB 71, the plaintiff’s car was damaged by a fire caused by the negligence of the defendants’ servants. The defendants relied on a clause that they would not be responsible for damage caused by fire to customers’ cars. It was held that the clause only operated as a warning that they would not be liable for fires caused by other factors aside from negligence. The fire was caused by negligence and as such, they were liable.
Third Parties
By the doctrine of privity of contract, an exclusion clause would not, as a rule, protect a person who is not a party to the contract. In Adler v Dickson [1955] 1 QB 158, a passenger fell from the gangway of a ship and sued the captain. The ticket excluded the company’s liability for injury caused by its servants’ negligence. The Court of Appeal held that the clause protected only the company, not third parties, which the servants were. As such, the servants were held liable.
This was confirmed by the House of Lords in Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] AC 446. Stevedores engaged by the carriers negligently damaged a drum of chemicals. The bill of lading limited the carriers’ liability to $500 per package. The House held that the stevedores could not rely on the limitation, since they were not parties to the contract.
The Effect of Exclusion Clauses on Fundamental Breach
In Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827, Lord Diplock defined a fundamental breach as a failure by one party to perform a primary obligation which deprives the other party of substantially the whole benefit the parties intended him to get from the contract.
The Rule of Law Doctrine
For a long time, the courts treated it as a substantive rule of law that a party guilty of a fundamental breach, or of a breach of a fundamental term, cannot rely on an exclusion clause, no matter how widely it is worded. In Karsales (Harrow) Ltd v Wallis [1956] 2 All ER 866, Wallis agreed to buy a Buick car on hire-purchase under a clause that “no condition or warranty” as to fitness was given. When it was delivered, parts of the car were missing and it could not move under its own power. The Court of Appeal held that the clause could not protect the owners from a breach of that gravity.
In Ogwu v Leventis Motors (1963) NRNLR 115, the appellant agreed to buy a one-year-old lorry but was given a four-year-old one. The clause excluding any warranty as to description, state or quality did not protect the respondents.
Suisse Atlantique: A Rule of Construction
The rule of law doctrine was shaken by the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique Societe d’Armement Maritime S.A. v N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361. A charterparty provided that the charterers would pay $1,000 a day as demurrage for delays in loading and unloading. The owners claimed that the delays were so serious that they amounted to a fundamental breach, so the demurrage clause should not apply and they could recover their full loss.
The House held that the demurrage clause was an agreed damages clause, not an exclusion clause. However, it also held that there is no rule of law that a fundamental breach destroys an exclusion clause. Whether the clause applies is a matter of construing the contract. This follows the view of Pearson L.J. in U.G.S. Finance Ltd v National Mortgage Bank of Greece [1964] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 446 that it is a rule of construction, based on the parties’ presumed intention, that an exclusion clause is not normally read as applying to a fundamental breach.
The judgments were, however, not consistent. Some passages, especially those of Lord Wilberforce and Lord Upjohn, seemed to support the rule of law doctrine. So, Lord Denning relied on Suisse Atlantique to keep applying the rule of law in Harbutts “Plasticine” Ltd v Wayne Tank and Pump Co. [1970] 1 All ER 225. The defendants installed unsuitable piping in the plaintiffs’ factory, which caused a fire that destroyed it. The contract limited the defendants’ liability to 2,300 pounds, but the factory cost about 150,000 pounds to rebuild. The Court of Appeal held that this was a fundamental breach and the limitation clause did not apply.
Photo Production v Securicor
The matter was settled in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827. The defendants contracted to provide security patrols at the plaintiffs’ factory. One of their patrolmen deliberately started a small fire which got out of control and destroyed the factory and stock, worth 615,000 pounds. The contract provided that the defendants would not be responsible for any injurious act or default by their employees unless it could have been foreseen and avoided with due diligence.
The House of Lords overruled Harbutts Plasticine and held that there is no rule of law by which a fundamental breach destroys an exclusion clause. The parties are free to agree whatever exclusion they choose. Whether a clause applies to a fundamental breach turns on the construction of the whole contract. Here, the clause was clear and protected the defendants. The House was also influenced by the fact that both parties were commercial concerns and the factory was insured, so the plaintiffs should look to their insurers.
The House reaffirmed this in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 All ER 737. The sellers supplied defective cabbage seed and the crop was commercially useless. The clause limited liability to the price of the seed, 201.60 pounds. Parker J. and the Court of Appeal held that the clause could not apply to a supply of goods wholly different from what was ordered. The House of Lords rejected this reasoning. According to Lord Bridge, it would bring back “by the back door” the doctrine of fundamental breach which Photo Production had removed. (The sellers were still held liable, but under the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973.)
Fundamental Breach in Nigeria
Until the FCCPA in 2018, Nigeria had no general legislation protecting consumers from unreasonable exclusion clauses. For a long time, the Nigerian courts kept applying the rule of law doctrine, taking the same position as Lord Denning in Harbutts Plasticine, even after Suisse Atlantique.
The Rule of Law Cases
In Dharamdas & Co. Ltd v Intercontra Ltd (unreported, High Court of Lagos, Dosumu J.), goods entrusted to the defendants for clearing and warehousing were stolen by their employee. Dosumu J. held that deliberately stealing the goods was a breach going to the very root of the contract, so the exclusion clause did not protect the defendants.
The Supreme Court took the same approach in Niger Insurance Ltd v Abed Brothers (1976) 6 UILR (Pt. 1) 61. The appellant insured the respondents’ trailer lorry, which was damaged in an accident in 1967 and not repaired until 1971. The respondents claimed for loss of profits, and the appellant relied on a clause exempting it from liability for consequential loss. The Supreme Court held that the implied term to repair within a reasonable time was a fundamental term of the policy. Having breached it, the appellant could not rely on the clause.
The attempted shift to the Rule of Construction
In the wake of the 1980 judgment in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd Nigerian courts have attempted to toe its line of reasoning regarding exclusion clauses and fundamental breaches. One of the first cases to do so is the case of Akinsanya v UBA (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 35) 273. The bank, wrongly released funds for the purchase of cement when a scammer presented a forged bills of lading. The bank sought to avoid liability by relying on an exclusion clause that prevented its liability in cases of errors. Relying on Photo Production, the Supreme Court held that the bank could rely on the clause exempting it from liability for the fundamental breach despite its negligence.
The Supreme Court took the same line in Narumal & Sons Nigeria Ltd v Niger Benue Transport Co. Ltd (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 730. The respondent carried the appellant’s goods by barge from Warri to Lagos, and the goods were damaged by sea water when the barge sprang a leak. The bill of lading stated that the respondent “accepts no responsibility or liability for any damage or loss however caused”. The Supreme Court found that the barge was not unseaworthy. However, relying on Suisse Atlantique and Photo Production, Nnamani J.S.C. held that even if there had been a fundamental breach, the clause was wide enough to protect the respondent. There is no rule of law that a fundamental breach nullifies an exclusion clause. It is a question of construction in each case.
The Court of Appeal took the same approach in Bank of Nigeria v B.U. Umeh & Sons Ltd (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 426) 565. Five years after Narumal, the Court of Appeal in DHL v Chidi (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt. 329) 720 held that the non-delivery of the parcel was a fundamental breach which made the exclusion clause inoperative.
The Supreme Court has finally made a definitive stand on the issue. In Mekwunye v. Emirates Airlines (2019) LPELR-46553 (SC) the appellant booked a flight with the respondent airline. However when she tried boarding, the airline abruptly cancelled the flight without justification. She sued for fundamental breach and damages, and the respondent tried to limit its liability by relying on an exclusion clause. The Supreme Court held that unjustifiably cancelling her flight is a fundamental breach and as such, an exclusion clause cannot exclude liability when there is a fundamental breach of the contract.
The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2018
In 2018, Nigeria enacted the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2018 (FCCPA) which generally protects consumers and has provisions against exclusion clauses.
Who Is Protected
The protection is for consumers. Under S.167, a consumer includes anyone who buys goods for his own use rather than for resale, and anyone to whom a service is rendered. However, a person who buys goods to use them in making other goods for sale is not a consumer. For example, a baker who buys flour to bake bread for sale would not be protected, but a person who buys the bread to eat would be.
Unfair Terms (S.127)
A business cannot deal with a consumer on unfair, unreasonable or unjust terms. It also cannot make a consumer give up his rights, or release the business from liability, on such terms. The Act gives examples of what is unfair. A term would be unfair in the following circumstances:
- If it heavily favours the business.
- If it is so harsh on the consumer that it is inequitable.
- If the consumer agreed to it because the business misled him.
- If the business never brought the term and its effect to the consumer’s attention.
Notice (S.128)
A business that wants to rely on a clause limiting its liability, shifting risk onto the consumer or making the consumer indemnify it must point that clause out clearly. It must be presented in a way an ordinary, alert consumer would notice, and the consumer must have a real chance to read and understand it before he commits or pays.
This simply means that the common law rules on notice now have statutory backing in consumer contracts. A clause buried in small print on the back of a receipt would not satisfy S.128.
Banned Terms (S.129)
Some terms cannot be used in a consumer contract at all, however clearly they are pointed out. For exclusion clauses, the relevant ones are terms that:
- Exclude or limit the business’s liability for loss caused by its gross negligence (or that of anyone acting for it), or push that loss onto the consumer.
- Take away the consumer’s right to return defective goods, or any other right the Act gives him.
- Make the consumer falsely confirm that no promises were made to him, or that he has received goods or documents he has not received.
Such a term would be void, but only the offending part. The rest of the contract stands. What this means is that in a consumer contract, a clause excluding liability for gross negligence fails automatically. Clear wording would not save it, and the Narumal rule of construction does not come into it.
Service Contracts (S.144)
The Act implies two terms into every contract where a business supplies a service:
- Under S.142(3), the supplier must carry out the service with reasonable care and skill.
- Under S.143, where the contract does not fix the time for the service (and the time cannot be worked out from the contract or the parties’ course of dealing), the supplier must carry out the service within a reasonable time.
As a general rule, parties to a service contract can vary these implied terms, whether by agreement, by a course of dealing or by trade usage. However, under S.144(2), a business providing a service to a consumer cannot exclude or limit its liability for breaching either of them. For example, a courier cannot rely on its waybill to escape liability for handling a consumer’s parcel carelessly, or, where no delivery time was agreed, for delivering it unreasonably late. Any stricter duty the general law places on the supplier also remains.