Most of the contracts we make every day are never written down. You agree a price with a tailor, you tell a mechanic to fix your car, you buy fuel at a filling station. If either side breaks his word, the court would still enforce the agreement once it is proved.
However, there are a few contracts that a court would refuse to enforce unless there is something in writing. A man who orally promised a bank that he would pay his brother’s loan can simply walk away from that promise. So can a landowner who agreed by word of mouth to sell you his plot.
As a general rule, form has no effect on the validity of a contract. A contract can be formal (under seal) or informal, and an informal contract can be written or oral. Form only matters where a statute says so. For example, a lease of more than three years must be made under seal by S.3 of the Real Property Act 1845 and S.42(i) of the Property and Conveyancing Law of Western Nigeria 1959. Wills, moneylending agreements, bills of exchange and promissory notes must be in writing, but not under seal.
This work focuses on the contracts caught by the Statute of Frauds 1677 and its Nigerian counterparts. It covers:
- The Statute of Frauds and where it applies in Nigeria.
- Contracts of guarantee.
- Contracts for the sale or other disposition of land.
- The effect of non-compliance.
- Part-performance.
These would be taken one by one below.
The Statute of Frauds and Its Application in Nigeria
The Statute of Frauds 1677 was an English statute. It was passed to stop dishonest litigants from bringing false claims backed by false evidence. Where the evidence was purely oral, the court was left to decide which witness to believe from his demeanour alone. The Statute of Frauds tried to end this by requiring written evidence of certain claims before the court would enforce them.
By Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, no action could be brought on five kinds of contract unless the agreement, or a memorandum or note of it, was in writing and signed by the party to be charged (the defendant) or his authorised agent. Section 17 made a similar provision for the sale of goods worth 10 pounds or more. The six categories were:
- A promise by an executor or administrator to pay the deceased’s liabilities out of his own pocket.
- A promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person.
- An agreement made in consideration of marriage.
- An agreement for the sale of land or the transfer of any interest in land.
- An agreement not to be performed within one year of its making.
- A sale of goods for 10 pounds or more.
In practice, the Statute of Frauds worked very badly. Dishonest parties used the absence of writing as an escape route from their obligations. Thus, a law meant to stop fraud became an instrument of fraud. The courts in turn drew fine distinctions to get around its plain meaning, and the result was confusion as to what the law was.
For these reasons, England got rid of most of it. Section 40 of the Law of Property Act 1925 re-enacted the land provision with minor changes, and the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954 repealed the rest of Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds except the guarantee provision. So, in England, only two of the six categories still need writing: contracts of guarantee and contracts for the sale of land or an interest in land.
The Statute of Frauds applies in Nigeria as a statute of general application in force in England before 1 January 1900. The 1954 English Act does not apply here, since it came after that date. However, some states have made their own reforms.
In Lagos, Section 5 of the Law Reform (Contracts) Act 1961 applies. In Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti, Edo and Delta States, Section 2 of the Contracts Law (Cap. 25) Laws of Western Nigeria 1959 applies. In these eight states, as in England, only guarantees and land contracts need to be in writing.
Lagos has since replaced the 1961 Act with the Law Reform (Contracts) Law 2015 which came into force on 25 May 2015. Section 9 of the 2015 Law lists four contracts that a court will not enforce unless they are in writing and signed by the person being sued or his agent:
- a sale of land;
- any other transfer of land that must be made by deed or in writing;
- a mortgage or charge on land; and
- a guarantee (a promise to pay another person’s debt if he fails to pay).
So, as before, only land contracts and guarantees need writing in Lagos. Section 10 adds that a written guarantee can still be enforced even if it does not state the consideration.
In the seven Western states, land contracts are also covered by a second law. Section 67(1) of the Property and Conveyancing Law, Cap. 100, Laws of Western Nigeria 1959 says that no one can be sued on a contract to sell or transfer land unless the contract, or a note of it, is in writing and signed by him or his agent.
In the remaining twenty-eight states, which were formerly the Northern and Eastern Regions, Sections 4 and 17 of the Statute of Frauds still apply in full. This simply means that all six categories still need writing there. In practice, however, the cases have been about guarantees and land, so this work would focus on those two.
Contracts of Guarantee
Scope
Under Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, and the similar sections in the Lagos and Western laws, a person cannot be sued on a promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another. The exception is where the promise, or a note of it, is in writing and signed by him or someone he has authorised.
The most common example is a guarantee of a bank loan. Tolu borrows money from a bank, and Ade promises the bank that he would repay it if Tolu fails to pay. Ade’s promise must be in writing. In the old trading days, storekeepers employed by companies like John Holt and U.A.C. also had to give a guarantee before they were employed or given an advance to buy produce.
The rule is not limited to debts arising from contract. It also covers a promise to pay for another person’s tort. In Kirkham v. Marter (1819) 2 B & Ald 613, the defendant’s son rode the plaintiff’s horse without permission and killed it. The defendant orally promised to pay the value of the horse but did not pay. The court held that since the promise was not in writing, it could not be enforced.
The same result was reached in Agbahowe v. Osayiobosa [1966] NMLR 360. The plaintiff’s car was damaged while a petrol attendant was repairing it, and the plaintiff relied on the station owner’s alleged promise to pay for the repairs. Begho J. held that the promise was not in writing as Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds required, so the claim on it would fail.
The Nature of a Contract of Guarantee
For a promise to come under the Statute of Frauds, it must be a contract of guarantee in the strict sense. Three parties must be involved:
- A creditor.
- A principal debtor.
- A promisor who undertakes to pay if the principal debtor fails to pay.
The principal debtor has the primary liability, and the promisor (the surety or secondary debtor) is only liable when the debtor defaults. This also means that the debtor’s liability must continue even after the promisor gives his undertaking.
In First Bank v. Pan Bisbilder [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt. 134) 647, Salami JCA described a guarantee as an assurance to the creditor that the guarantor would repay the debt if the principal debtor fails to pay. It follows that where the creditor and the debtor alter their contract without the guarantor’s knowledge and consent, the guarantor is discharged. The exception is where the alteration is neither substantial nor prejudicial to him.
Where the promisor takes on the liability himself, instead of backing up the debt of another, the contract is one of indemnity. What this means is that the promisor is the debtor. A contract of indemnity is enforceable even though it is not in writing.
In Bentworth Finance (Nig.) Ltd v. Ibrahim (unreported, High Court of Lagos, Suit No. LD/479/69), the defendant signed an “indemnity agreement” for the hire-purchase of a lorry by Inaolaji Trading and Transport Services. He undertook to pay any instalments the company failed to pay. When sued, he argued that an indemnity needs three parties, and that he and Inaolaji were one and the same, since Inaolaji had no legal existence apart from him. A debtor cannot indemnify himself. The court held that this was not a guarantee but an indemnity, which does not need three parties, and the defendant was liable.
Where there is no other debtor at all, the case for an indemnity is even stronger. In Mountstephen v. Lakeman (1874) LR 7 HL 17, a contractor asked the chairman of a public board of health whether he would be responsible for payment if the contractor connected some drains to a sewer. The chairman replied: “Go on, Mountstephen, and do the work, I will see you paid.” The board later refused to ratify the chairman’s action. It was held that the chairman’s promise was a primary liability, an indemnity, which did not need to be in writing. When it was made, both parties knew the board was not liable to the contractor.
Exceptions to the Requirement of Writing
Part of a Larger Transaction
The Statute of Frauds (and the similar provisions in the Lagos and Western laws) only applies to a guarantee that stands alone. It does not apply where the guarantee is merely incidental to a larger transaction.
In Sutton v. Grey [1894] 1 QB 285, the defendants orally agreed with a stockbroker to introduce clients to him. They would receive half of the commission earned and pay half of the losses if a client failed to pay. It was held that their promise to answer for a client’s debt was merely part of the wider brokerage contract. It did not need to be in writing.
The same applies to a del credere agent. This is an agent who, for an extra commission (a del credere commission), guarantees to his principal that the third parties he deals with would pay. His guarantee is part of a wider transaction, so it need not be in writing. However, without the commission, there is no del credere agency. In Ejeboi v. Ekpokai (unreported, Midwestern State High Court, Suit No. U/5A/70), a farmer at Afuze undertook to convey the corn harvest of the Afuze Farmers’ Union to Ibadan for sale. The corn trader in Ibadan bought on credit and never paid. The court held that the defendant got no commission at all, so he was not a del credere agent and was not liable to the other farmers. Their remedy lay against the corn trader.
Protection of Property
Where the promisor has rights over property that is burdened by a debt owed to a third party, a guarantee he gives to free that property is not covered by the Statute of Frauds. In Fitzgerald v. Dressler (1859) 7 CB (NS) 374, A sold linseed to B, who resold it at a higher price to C. As unpaid seller, A had a lien over the goods, meaning that he could hold them until B paid. C wanted the goods, so he orally promised to pay for them if B failed to pay. It was held that the promise was mainly aimed at getting rid of A’s lien to protect C’s property, not to guarantee B’s debt. A could recover the price from C.
The courts appear to have halted the growth of this exception in Harburg India Rubber Comb Co. v. Martin [1902] 1 KB 778. There, a major shareholder orally promised to pay a company’s debts so that execution against the company’s property would be stopped. It was held that this was a guarantee within the Statute of Frauds and was unenforceable without writing. Unlike a debenture holder, a shareholder has no proprietary interest in the company’s goods.
Oral Variation of Written Agreements
A contract which the law requires to be in writing can be rescinded by an oral agreement. However, it can only be modified by an agreement in writing.
In U.A.C. v. John Argo (1958) 14 NLR 105, the company employed the defendant as storekeeper on a written and signed condition that he would not sell goods on credit. Any loss from a breach would be his. The company later orally permitted him to sell on credit, and he made a loss of 152 pounds 12 shillings. The court held that the written prohibition had been validly rescinded orally. The company argued that he was still personally liable because he had recommended the credit customers. The court held that this, if accepted, would be an oral variation of an agreement required to be in writing. If it is, it has to be in written down. Since it wasn’t, it was held to be unenforceable.
Contracts for the Sale or Other Disposition of Any Land
Under the Statute of Frauds and its Nigerian counterparts, no action can be brought on an agreement for the sale of land, or the transfer of any interest in land, unless the agreement, or a memorandum or note of it, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged.
The Statute of Frauds as It Affects Illiterates and Customary Law
Section 5(3)(a) of the Law Reform (Contracts) Act 1961 (Lagos) expressly exempts sales and other dispositions of land under customary law from the requirement of writing. The same exemption is now in Section 9(3)(a) of the Law Reform (Contracts) Law 2015 (Lagos). The Western Region Contracts Law 1959 has no such provision. However, this does not mean that customary land transactions elsewhere need writing. The Statute of Frauds and its Western Nigerian counterpart were aimed at English land tenure and land held under English or received law. So, they could not have affected transactions under customary law, and any change to that would have to be express and clear.
Where the transaction is not one under customary law, an illiterate is bound by the requirement of writing like any other person. His only special protection comes from the Illiterates Protection Laws. For example, the writer of a document for an illiterate must write his own name and address on it, so that he can be traced if necessary.
Two old cases, Bintu Alake v. Awawu (1932) 11 NLR 39 and Okoleji v. Okupe (1939) 15 NLR 28, have been read as saying that the Statute of Frauds cannot be used against an illiterate, but can be used by an illiterate against a literate person. This reading is doubtful.
In Bintu Alake, an illiterate woman gave part of her property to one of her children. The other two challenged the gift because the transfer was not in writing. The court held that there had been a gift, and refused to lay down a strict rule that an illiterate’s land could not be disposed of without complying with the Statute of Frauds. Although the judgement does not say so, the land appears to have been transferred under customary law, where writing was not needed anyway.
In Okoleji v. Okupe, the plaintiff borrowed money from the defendant and handed over her title deeds as security. The defendant then claimed she had agreed to sell him the property. The court held that this was untrue, and that in any case the lack of writing was fatal to his claim. Two factors explain the decision. First, the defendant had sued separately for a conveyance in the English form, so English law and the Statute of Frauds applied. Second, the transaction was really one of moneylending, and the Moneylenders Ordinance required it to be in writing anyway.
Thus, an illiterate who deals in land outside customary law should be advised to put the transaction on paper and get the necessary signatures.
Contents of a Memorandum
An oral agreement to transfer an interest in land cannot be enforced without a memorandum. In Ekpanya v. Akpan [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) 86, the plaintiff claimed he had bought land and leased part of it in 1974 to one S.A. Akpan. After Akpan’s death, his family took possession and denied the plaintiff’s title. There was no document at all supporting the plaintiff’s ownership or the lease. The Court of Appeal (Enugu Division) held that even if there had been an oral lease, Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds prevented the plaintiff from enforcing it. There must at least be a memorandum referable to the land and containing all the essential terms.
The Statute of Frauds does not say what the memorandum must contain, so this has been left to the courts.
The memorandum must name the parties, and an agent who signs in his own name satisfies the Statute of Frauds. In Abdul Karim Basma v. Weekes [1950] AC 441, the Privy Council held that an agent who contracts in his own name is still bound, even where the other party knew he was an agent. His name is enough.
The memorandum must also describe the subject-matter and state the consideration (the price), though absolute precision is not needed. Rosenje v. Bakare (unreported, Supreme Court, Suit No. SC 48/71, 10 May 1973) shows both points. The land was described as a piece of land at Western Avenue, Surulere, measuring 48.7′ by 100′ and adjacent to No. 55 Western Avenue. This was accepted as adequate. The receipt stated that Olasonde Gisanrin had received six hundred pounds from Bashiru Rosenje as “amount paid for a piece of land at Western Avenue, Surulere”. The High Court held that it did not state that 600 pounds was the full price. On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected this. In their plain meaning, the words “amount paid for a piece of land” meant full payment. If a smaller sum had been meant, words to show it should have been used.
From these cases, it is clear that every memorandum must contain:
- The names and identity of the parties (Abdul Karim Basma v. Weekes [1950] AC 441).
- A description of the subject-matter (Rosenje v. Bakare, unreported, Suit No. SC 48/71).
- The consideration (Apara v. U.A.C. (1951) 20 NLR 17; Rosenje v. Bakare).
On the parties, the memorandum must show who is selling and who is buying. Descriptions like “proprietor” or “trustee selling under a trust for sale” have been accepted (Catling v. King (1877) 5 Ch D 660), but plain terms like “vendor” and “purchaser” avoid confusion.
Apart from these three, other material terms depend on the type of contract. A lease would need its date of commencement, its duration and vacant possession, while a mortgage, an easement or a quarrying agreement would have different terms. In African Coastal Shipping Service v. Nigerian Ports Authority (1973) 3 UILR 27 and U.B.A. v. Tejumola & Sons Ltd [1988] 2 NWLR (Pt. 79) 662, it was held that a memorandum of a lease which leaves out the commencement date does not comply with the Statute of Frauds.
Where a material term was put in for the benefit of one party only, he may waive it and enforce the contract without it, if the term is not of major importance. In North v. Loomes [1919] 1 Ch 378, North agreed to sell land to Loomes, and they agreed that Loomes would pay North’s costs of the sale. This term was left out of the memorandum. When North sued to enforce the sale, the question was whether a memorandum missing that term was sufficient under the Statute of Frauds. Since the term was there for North’s benefit, North told the court he would give it up. The court accepted this and ordered Loomes to complete the purchase (a decree of specific performance).
In Scott v. Bradley [1971] 1 Ch 850, Scott agreed to buy land from Bradley and sued for specific performance. Bradley argued that the memorandum was not sufficient because it left out Scott’s obligation to pay half of Bradley’s legal costs. Since that term was for Bradley’s benefit, Scott agreed to pay it, and specific performance was granted. In essence, a plaintiff can still enforce a contract with a missing term where the term is for the defendant’s benefit and the plaintiff is willing to comply with it, or where the term is for the plaintiff’s own benefit and he waives it.
Form of the Document
The document need not be drawn up as a note or memorandum. Any writing which contains the material terms would be enough. In Rosenje’s case, a receipt was accepted (see also Hamilton v. Kofi Mensah (1937) 2 WACA 224).
Letters to third parties (Apara v. U.A.C. (1951) 20 NLR 17) have also been accepted, and so have the minutes of a company’s board meeting. In Jones v. Victoria Graving Dock Co. (1877) 2 QBD 314, the terms of the agreement were recorded in the company’s minutes, and the minutes were signed by the chairman as S.67 of the Companies Act 1862 required. The court held that the signed minutes were a sufficient memorandum under Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds.
A letter between the parties’ solicitors can also be enough. In Law v. Jones [1974] Ch 112, the English Court of Appeal held that a letter from the defendant’s solicitor to the plaintiff’s solicitor, setting out the terms of an oral agreement for the sale of land, was a sufficient memorandum even though it was marked “subject to contract”. However, a later Court of Appeal disapproved this in Tiverton Estates Ltd v. Wearwell Ltd [1975] Ch 146. It held that a document marked “subject to contract” cannot be a sufficient memorandum, because it does not admit that a contract exists.
The general rule is that the memorandum should exist before the case is brought before the court. In Farr, Smith & Co. v. Messers Ltd [1928] 1 KB 397 Messers orally agreed to supply firewood to a company, Farr, Smith & Co. Ltd, but never delivered. The company sued, and Messers argued that there was no written memorandum. The only writing was Messers’ own defence, filed in an earlier form of the same suit, which set out the agreement. Wright J. held that the defence was enough. The suit had been so changed (a new plaintiff and a new claim) that it counted as a fresh action, so the defence existed before that action began.
Signature
It is enough if the memorandum is signed by the party to be charged, i.e. the defendant. The courts have been very liberal about what counts as a signature. Any form of the party’s name which shows that he means to authenticate the document is enough. It need not be at the foot of the document; it can be in the body or at the beginning. Initials, a signature in pencil and a mark have all been accepted.
In Sanderson v. Jackson (1800) 2 B & P 238, the vendor’s name was printed at the head of an invoice he sent to the buyer, which also set out the particulars, qualities and prices of the goods. The printed name was held to be a sufficient signature.
An agent may sign for his principal if he is authorised, and his authority need not be in writing. A solicitor has no general authority to sign for his client, but the authority can be implied from the nature of his work. In North v. Loomes, a solicitor authorised to complete a contract was held to be lawfully authorised to sign the documents for his client.
In Lagos, emails and electronic signatures now count. Section 2 of the Law Reform (Contracts) Law 2015 treats an email, fax or other electronic message as writing. Section 3 treats a digital signature as a signature, as long as it shows that the person meant to sign. So in Lagos, an exchange of emails can now be a sufficient memorandum of a land contract or a guarantee.
Agreement Contained in Several Documents
The terms may be spread over several documents. These would be joined to form a memorandum where the document signed by the defendant refers, expressly or by implication, to another document or transaction. Oral evidence can then be given to identify the other document.
In Shittu v. Mbonu [1995] 4 NWLR (Pt. 389) 341, Shittu was a tenant in a house that Mbonu had bought. Shittu orally offered to buy the house from Mbonu for ₦55,000, and Mbonu orally agreed. Almost ten years later, Shittu had paid only ₦30,000. Mbonu sued to cancel the sale and take back the house.
The trial judge ruled for Mbonu, but on the basis that there was nothing in writing. The Court of Appeal agreed that Mbonu should win, but held that there was writing after all. Mbonu’s lawyer had written to Shittu, naming both of them, describing the house, and stating the price, what had been paid, the ₦25,000 still owed and that the sale would be cancelled if he did not pay. Shittu wrote back admitting all of this and explaining why he could not pay. Read together, the two letters were a sufficient memorandum.
However, two documents can only be read together if the one signed by the defendant refers to the other. In Timmins v. Moreland Street Property Co. Ltd [1958] Ch 110, Timmins orally agreed to sell some property to the company for 39,000 pounds. Two documents came out of the deal:
- A cheque for the 3,900 pounds deposit, signed for the company and made out to Timmins’s solicitors.
- A receipt, signed by Timmins, setting out the property and the price.
When Timmins sued to enforce the sale, the company argued that it had signed no memorandum. The Court of Appeal agreed. The receipt contained all the terms, but it was signed by Timmins, not the company. The cheque was signed for the company, but it said nothing about the sale or the receipt. Since the cheque did not refer to the receipt, the two could not be read together, and Timmins could not enforce the sale.
Note that the memorandum must contain all the terms and show that the parties actually agreed to them.
These memorandum rules apply to every contract caught by Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, not only land contracts. That is why the two cases below concern employment agreements that could not be performed within a year, another category under Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds.
In Re Alexander’s Timber Co. (1901) 70 LJ Ch 767, an agreement to employ a managing director for five years could not be enforced, because the memorandum did not say when his employment was to start.
In Apara v. U.A.C. (1951) 20 NLR 17, Apara claimed that U.A.C. had promised to make him an assistant manager once he finished a long training course. Since the job would start more than a year later, the promise had to be in writing. The documents Apara relied on only showed that U.A.C. intended to appoint him “if he shaped well”. The court held that an intention to appoint someone is not a promise to do so, so his claim for breach of contract failed.
Effect of Non-Compliance with the Statute of Frauds
An agreement that fails to comply with the Statute of Frauds and similar statutes in Nigeria is unenforceable, but it is not void or voidable. The difference matters. An unenforceable contract is a valid contract with a procedural defect: it cannot be enforced directly by bringing an action on it.
Since the contract is merely unenforceable, the defendant must expressly plead the absence of writing as a defence. If he does not, oral evidence would be admitted to prove the contract, and it would be enforced against him.
In Laja v. Isiba (unreported, High Court of Lagos State, Dabiri J., 6 May 1975), Isiba orally agreed to sell eight plots of land to Laja. When Laja did not pay, Isiba sold the plots to someone else without first cancelling his agreement with Laja. Laja sued for damages or, in the alternative, specific performance. There was nothing in writing, but Isiba had not raised the Statute of Frauds in his defence. Dabiri J. held that a defendant who does not plead the Statute of Frauds is taken to accept that there is a sufficient memorandum, so Laja could prove the sale by oral evidence.
The Supreme Court took the same approach in Obijiaku v. Offiah [1995] 7 NWLR (Pt. 409) 510. A landlord sued his tenant for unpaid rent under a tenancy that had never been put in writing. The tenant did not plead the absence of writing, so the trial judge admitted oral evidence of the tenancy and gave judgement for the landlord. The judge added that the Statute of Frauds should not be used as an instrument of fraud, and that both parties had clearly acted on the tenancy. The Supreme Court upheld the judgement, noting that neither party had objected to the oral evidence.
Although a party cannot sue on an unenforceable contract, he can rely on it as a defence if he is sued.
Since an unenforceable contract is not void, money or property transferred under it cannot be recovered. In Thomas v. Brown (1876) 1 QBD 714, Thomas paid Brown a deposit under an oral contract to buy land, then decided not to go ahead. He sued to get the deposit back and lost. Brown could not have sued Thomas on the oral contract, but he could rely on it to keep the deposit, because the contract was valid and he was still willing to complete it.
However, where it is the vendor who repudiates the oral contract, the purchaser would be entitled to recover his deposit for total failure of consideration.
Part-Performance: The Intervention of Equity
Basis of the Doctrine
Where a party to an oral contract has performed his own part, expecting the other party to do the same, the court would not allow the other party to escape by pleading the Statute of Frauds. Instead, it would order specific performance. This is the doctrine of part-performance.
There are two views on the basis of the doctrine. According to Sir Frederick Pollock, it rests on estoppel: a defendant who by his conduct plainly showed that a contract existed cannot turn round and shelter behind the Statute of Frauds. The other view is that a contract within the Statute of Frauds is not void but merely unenforceable. Since writing is only required as evidence, other evidence of the contract is allowed, and acts of part-performance are such evidence.
Udolisa v. Nwanosike [1973] ECSLR 653 is a classic illustration. Nwanosike’s agent told Udolisa that if he pulled down the mud building on her land, built a modern house in its place and paid her 200 pounds, she would give him a lease of the new house. Udolisa did all of this, putting up a twenty-four-room building. Nwanosike then refused to grant the lease, and asked him to pull down his building and rebuild her mud house. Udolisa sued for specific performance. Nwanosike argued that the agreement concerned land and was not in writing, so it could not be enforced. Oputa J. rejected this. Udolisa had done his part, so equity would enforce the agreement, and the court ordered Nwanosike to grant the lease. In the judge’s words, statutes meant to prevent fraud should never be made the willing handmaids of fraud.
The doctrine has been applied many times in Nigeria. In Mba-Ede v. Okafor [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) 787, Mba-Ede orally sold his building to Okafor for ₦40,000 in 1985. Okafor paid ₦19,000 and moved in, but did not pay the remaining ₦21,000. Mba-Ede sued to get the building back. The trial court refused, and instead ordered that the sale go ahead if Okafor paid the balance within thirty days. Mba-Ede appealed and lost. The Court of Appeal held that, although the sale was never in writing, the law would not let the absence of writing be used to cheat a buyer who had partly performed. It also held that Sections 22, 26 and 34 of the Land Use Act 1978, which require the Governor’s consent before land is transferred, do not stop a court from ordering specific performance.
The Supreme Court has also made clear when a buyer who has paid only part of the price can get specific performance. It depends on who is at fault.
If the seller is at fault, the buyer can get it. In Ohiaeri v. Yussuf (2009) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1137) 207, a widow agreed in 1982 to sell a house in Victoria Island, Lagos, to Yussuf and his co-plaintiff for ₦850,000. They paid ₦481,000. The widow stayed in the house. In 1985, she and her daughter sold the same house to Ohiaeri, whose lawyer knew of the first sale. The Supreme Court held that the first buyers had paid and were in possession in law, even though the widow still lived there. This gave them an equitable interest in the house, which beat Ohiaeri’s later purchase. The 1982 sale was enforced.
If the buyer is at fault, he cannot. In Mustapha v. Abubakar (2026) 7 NWLR (Pt. 2043) 541, Mustapha agreed in February 1998 to buy Abubakar’s house in Kaduna for ₦600,000. He paid ₦350,000 and promised to pay the remaining ₦250,000 by 16 March 1998. He did not pay on time. When he came with the money on 19 March, Abubakar had already sold the house to someone else. Mustapha sued for specific performance and lost in every court. The Supreme Court held that a buyer who pays only part of the price and then defaults has no valid sale, even if he is in possession. He cannot ask the court to enforce a contract he himself broke.
Conditions for the Operation of Part-Performance
For the doctrine to apply, the four conditions below must be satisfied.
There Must Be a Prior Oral Agreement
The acts of part-performance must carry out an oral agreement that already exists. Where the plaintiff acts on his own, out of kindness, charity or in hope of a reward, the doctrine would not apply, even if the defendant later promises him something in return.
In Kuri v. Kuri 4 NLR 78, John and Rotus Kuri, two Syrian brothers, jointly owned a house in Calabar. They invited a third brother, Moses, to live there with them. While John was away on business in Las Palmas for six months, Moses looked after his business and family and spent 249 pounds repairing the house. Later, John and Moses fell out, and John sued to evict Moses. Moses counter-claimed, saying John had agreed to give him a third share of the house and that the repairs were his part-performance. The court held that there was no definite agreement when Moses spent the money. He paid for the repairs on his own, long before the alleged promise, so they could not count as part-performance.
Reference to Contract
The acts relied on must point to some contract. The old view, from Maddison v. Alderson (1883) 8 App Cas 467, was that they must point only to the contract alleged. Elizabeth Maddison was Thomas Alderson’s housekeeper. When she wanted to leave, he persuaded her to stay on without wages by promising to leave her a life interest in his farm. She stayed until he died, and he made a will leaving her that life interest, but the will turned out to be invalid. His heir sued to recover the farm, and Maddison counter-claimed for her life interest. The House of Lords held that her acts did not point only to a contract. She might have stayed for other reasons, such as present comfort or the hope of being provided for. Her claim failed.
However, this is no longer the law. In Kingswood Estate Co. Ltd v. Anderson [1963] 2 QB 169, the Court of Appeal held that it is enough if the acts are referable to some contract and consistent with the contract alleged. It does not matter that they are also consistent with other agreements.
This was followed in Wakeham v. Mackenzie [1968] 1 WLR 1175, on facts close to those of Maddison’s case. A seventy-two-year-old widower orally agreed with the plaintiff that if she moved into his house and looked after him, she would have the house and its contents when he died. She gave up her own flat, moved in, cared for him until his death and paid 2 pounds a week into the household kitty. He did not leave her the house, so she sued for specific performance. The court held that her acts could only be explained by some contract and were consistent with the one she alleged, and ordered specific performance. The House of Lords later confirmed this less restrictive test in Steadman v. Steadman [1974] 2 All ER 977, affirmed [1976] AC 536.
Fraud
The acts of part-performance must be such that it would be a fraud for the defendant to take advantage of the contract not being in writing.
Enforceability
The contract must by its nature attract specific performance. So, the remedy would not be granted where damages would be an adequate remedy, or in contracts of personal service.
Nor would it be granted where the court would have to supervise performance constantly. Indeed, it is widely believed that only contracts involving land can attract the doctrine of part-performance.
In Ryan v. Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association [1893] 1 Ch 116, the lease of a flat promised that the landlords would provide a resident porter who would be constantly in attendance. The porter they appointed was often absent because he also worked as a cook, and the tenant asked the court to order the landlords to keep their promise. The Court of Appeal refused. Enforcing the promise would have meant the court watching over the porter’s work day after day, so the tenant was left to claim damages.
Finally, the remedy would not be granted where the obligations of both parties are not equally enforceable, for example where the plaintiff is an infant. An infant can back out of a contract for an interest in land while he is under age and for a short time after he comes of age (twenty-one, for contracts in Nigeria), so the other party could not hold him to it.